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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years used to seem like an exceedingly long time. It
certainly did when I was graduating from law school and not yet twentyfive. My perspective on time, however, has (naturally) since evolved, much
as environmental law itself and the controversies surrounding it have, too,
evolved.
The contrast between environmental law twenty-five years ago and
environmental law today is remarkable and makes clear that environmental
law and lawmaking were changing in fundamental ways a generation ago,
but those changes are revealed only now with the aid of hindsight. To be
sure, the statutory texts of domestic environmental law are strikingly the
same. And yet, it is that static quality that ironically underscores how much
has changed.
A generation ago, environmental law scholars would routinely comment
on how the only constant in environmental law was change: its dynamic

*
Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard University. This
Essay is based on a keynote presentation I delivered at the 25th Annual Meeting of the
National Association of Environmental Law Societies, hosted at the University of Michigan
Law School on March 22–24, 2012. I would like to thank the organizers of that meeting for
inviting me to speak at that event and Harvard Law School student Benjamin Apple for his
excellent research assistance.
267
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nature.1 Congress was regularly passing significant statutory amendments in
what was largely a constructive iterative lawmaking process, involving federal and state legislatures, agencies, and courts. Some might have worried
that the change was too great—making it too difficult for the regulated
community to adjust and invest.2 Whether any such concern then was justified, the concern now is quite different: too little change rather than too
much. And the static nature of environmental lawmaking here in the United
States stands in sharp contrast to the dynamic nature of environmental
lawmaking globally.3 The United States, once a lauded pioneer, now very
much risks being left behind.
This essay is written in celebration of the 25th Annual Meeting of the
National Association of Environmental Law Societies at the University of
Michigan Law School and in recognition of Michigan Law’s hosting of the
Association’s inaugural meeting in 1988. The essay focuses on three topics
in reflecting on the changes in environmental law and environmental lawmaking since the Association’s first meeting. The first is Congress and the
politics of environmental law. The second topic concerns the courts and the
changing relationship of constitutional law to environmental law. And,
finally, the essay considers the contrasting nature of the challenges that
environmental lawyers and environmental law face today as compared to
twenty-five years ago.

I. CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
Twenty-five years ago, the nation could legitimately boast of a
Congress fully engaged in environmental lawmaking.4 Both Democrats and
Republicans worked together to enact sweeping, ambitious federal environmental laws. By the time of the Association’s first conference in 1988,
prior decades had witnessed an explosion of federal environmental
protection laws.

1.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 791 (1994); see also Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentation and the “New”
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1062–68 (1994).
2.
Or, as I once wrote, environmental law’s dynamic quality might create tensions
with efforts to criminalize violations of environmental protection standards to the extent
that “[c]riminal law emphasizes settled norms, while environmental law constantly changes
and aspires for fundamental and dramatic change.” Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands
of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83
GEO. L.J. 2407, 2445 (1995).
3.
Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 645–49 (2009).
4.
Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 625–29 (2006).
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A mere listing of the laws from the 1970s is illustrative.5
Statute

Year

NEPA

1970

Clean Air Act

1970

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

1972

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

1972

Noise Control Act

1972

Coastal Zone Management Act

1972

Endangered Species Act

1973

Safe Drinking Water Act

1974

Forest Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act

1974

Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments

1976

Toxic Substances Control Act

1976

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

1976

National Forest Management Act

1976

Federal Land Policy and Management Act

1976

Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act

1976

Clean Air Act Amendments

1977

Clean Water Act Amendments

1977

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act

1977

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

1978

These were no less than revolutionary laws in their aspiration and
potential reach. They promised an upending of the then-prevailing relationship of human activity to the natural environment and included tough new
pollution control standards applicable to emissions of pollutants into the
ambient air,6 discharges of pollutants into navigable waters,7 and disposal of
hazardous wastes onto land.8
And the laws were not just pollution control laws. They extended to
sweeping natural resource management, conservation, and preservation laws
and were applicable to public lands,9 coastal zone,10 endangered species,11
fisheries,12 national forests,13 and coal lands.14 Almost all the laws were
5.
Id. at 625.
6.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7409 (2006).
7.
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1311 (2006).
8.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6924–6925 (2006).
9.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006 &
Supp. II 2008).
10.
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006).
11.
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
12.
Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891D (2006).
13.
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2006).
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enacted by lopsided bipartisan majority votes in both congressional
chambers.15
Nor did this pattern abate in the 1980s. Just the opposite. Consider
1980, the first year of the second decade of modern environmental law.
Congress passed two laws in December 1980: the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),16 and the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).17 In theory,
Congress never should have enacted either of these laws. Why? Because just
a few weeks before, the nation had elected a new president, Ronald Reagan,
who had campaigned against just those kinds of federal laws.18 And, no less
significant, the Democrats had lost their Senate majority, so the Republicans were going to take control of the Senate in a few weeks for the first
time in decades. That is more than a lame duck Congress. That has all the
trappings of a dead duck Congress. In this situation, nothing of significance
should have passed because the political party ascending to the White
House and the Senate leadership had every incentive to block its passage,
which is not hard to do under our political system.
CERCLA is one of the toughest pollution control and pollution liability laws Congress has ever enacted, and ANILCA is one of the most
sweeping natural resource conservation laws.19 Yet both laws passed, because
leading Republicans ultimately supported their passage.20 These leaders
included Senator Howard Baker from Tennessee, who would become the
Senate Majority Leader, and Senator Robert Stafford from Vermont, who
would become Chair of the Senate Committee on the Environment and
Public Works.21 Rather than block the laws, they joined with leading Democrats and a lame duck president to make the compromises necessary to

14.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–79
(2006).
15.
Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323 (1991) (“The average vote in favor of
major federal environmental legislation during the 1970s was seventy-six to five in the
Senate and 331 to thirty in the House.”).
16.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006); Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
17.
16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2006); Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (1980).
18.
Hedrick Smith, President Concedes: Republican Gains Victories in All Areas and Vows
to Act on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1980, at A1; Philip Shabecoff, Major Environment
Leaders Back Carter Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1980, § 1 at 36; Editorial, The
Environment and the Stump, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1980, at A30.
19.
Lazarus, supra note 4, at 626.
20.
Philip Shabecoff, Compromise on ‘Superfund,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1980, at D9;
Joanne Omang, Senate Approves Fund to Clean Up Hazardous Wastes, WASH. POST, Nov. 25,
1980, at A1; Seth S. King, Compromise Bill to Preserve Alaskan Lands Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1980, at A1.
21.
See Shabecoff, supra note 20.
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secure CERCLA’s and ANILCA’s passage.22 Senator Stafford, in particular,
pushed hard for the hazardous waste law’s passage.23
During the rest of the decade, Congress enacted more laws.24 These
new laws were increasingly detailed and more finely tuned.25 Congress, in
other words, did what Congress should do: learn from experience, amend
laws in light of that experience, and thereby engage in an appropriately
thoughtful, reflective, and iterative lawmaking process.
In 1988, then-Vice President George Bush campaigned for president,
declaring that he would be the first “Environmental President.”26 He famously criticized the Democratic Candidate and Governor of Massachusetts,
Michael Dukakis, for failing to ensure adequate cleanup of Boston Harbor
from water pollution.27 And immediately after his election, President Bush
sought to fulfill his campaign promise, at least for the first two years of his
presidency.28 He appointed William Reilly as Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Administrator, an individual of unquestioned—indeed unparalleled—credentials for that position.29 The White House, along with
the EPA, also championed passage of sweeping amendments to the Clean
Air Act, breaking a legislative logjam that had precluded the enactment of
long-overdue amendments for thirteen years.30 The Administration worked
closely with environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense
Fund and Democratic congressional leaders such as Senate Majority Leader
George Mitchell.31 The result of such bipartisan collaboration was a statute
that wholly revamped federal air pollution control law and that is widely
trumpeted as having achieved significant gains in the nation’s air quality.32
What no one could or did know in 1990 was that the Clean Air Act was
essentially Congress’s last hurrah. Based on the 1990 success there was
reason to assume that the trend would be increasing congressional engage22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Lazarus, supra note 4, at 626–28.
25.
Id.
26.
See John Holusha, Bush Pledges Efforts to Clean Up Air and Water, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1988, at B9; see also Mark Green, How Dukakis Can Overcome Bush’s ‘Slur du Jour,’
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1988, § 1, at 27.
27.
Robin Toner, Bush, in Enemy Waters, Says Rival Hindered Cleanup of Boston Harbor,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1988, at A16.
28.
See Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A. Nominee Says He Will Urge Law to Cut Acid Rain, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1989, at A1.
29.
Id.
30.
Keith Schneider, How Clean Air Became Part of the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1990, § 4, at E4.
31.
Keith Schneider, Ambitious Air Pollution Bill Sent to White House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 1990, § 1, at 38.
32.
E.g., U.S. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990
TO 2020, 7-1 to 7-10 (2011).
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ment and bipartisanship. After all, the thirteen-year logjam had been
successfully broken. We now see, more than two decades later, that the
Clean Air Act was the last gasp of congressional bipartisanship. To be sure,
there have been a few episodic lawmaking moments since, but nothing of
the grand scale of the 1990 law or those that routinely became law in the
two prior decades. If the first two decades can be fairly characterized as the
“ascent” of Congress in environmental lawmaking, the last two-plus decades
can be fairly dubbed congressional “descent.”33
Capitol Hill may look the same on the outside. But it is completely
different on the inside. It is not the Congress of the 1970s, 1980s, or of
1990. It is instead a legislative body that has essentially abdicated its
lawmaking responsibilities in environmental law. And it is not as though
new laws and amendments are needed less now than before. Today, new
information and new challenges warrant statutory attention. The whole
world around us is changing along several dimensions: economically,
politically, and now with climate change, ecologically.
There is, moreover, a major cost to such abdication. In the absence of
necessary amendment and addition, agencies are nonetheless compelled to
address the problems of the day rather than the problems of yesterday. But
when limited to the laws enacted in response to the latter, agencies are
invariably forced to act at the border of their lawmaking authorities or
beyond those borders, which in turn prompts protracted, unsettling, and
often successful litigation. Today, for instance, EPA is struggling to address
global climate change within the existing terms of the Clean Air Act. Some
issues are easy, such as whether greenhouse gases are an air pollutant within
the meaning of that law.34 Others are, according to the agency’s own
description, impossibly hard, such as applying the prevention of significant
deterioration program and Title VI permitting program to all sources of
greenhouse gases that fall within the Act’s literal terms.35
Even worse, the only times that Congress does act these days is
through appropriation bills: omnibus budget bills which can number in the
thousands of pages. There is, often deliberately, no opportunity to read the
bill, which can be riddled with hidden riders, let alone engage in meaningful debate and discussion. It is the worst kind of lawmaking. The riders
33.
Lazarus, supra note 4, at 629–32.
34.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007).
35.
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31513, 31516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51–52, 70–71)
(describing EPA’s reliance in greenhouse gas rulemaking on the “‘administrative necessity’
doctrine, which authorizes agencies to apply statutory requirements in a way that avoids
impossible administrative results.”). On June 26, 2012, the D.C. Circuit dismissed an industry challenge to this regulation for lack of Article III standing. See Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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themselves invariably represent short-term, impulsive interests rather than
the application of long-term perspective and expertise.36
The most notorious example is the Salvage Timber Rider that Congress
considered and enacted in 1995.37 The emergency appropriations legislation
was meant to provide funds for the victims of the Oklahoma City
bombing.38 But after riders were inserted, to vote for appropriations for
bombing victims required also voting to allow timber harvesting in old
growth forest in the Pacific Northwest.39 The legal effect of the rider, as law,
was to override a then-existing court injunction of such forest cutting based
on violations of the National Environmental Policy Act and Endangered
Species Act.40
But this is what tends to be the beginning and end of congressional
lawmaking efforts these days. As a result, most efforts on Capitol Hill these
days seem directed at trying to prevent Congress from doing something illadvised, rather than passing new laws that the nation needs. A far cry from
the late 1980s, when the first National Association of Environmental Law
Societies met at the University of Michigan Law School.

II. THE COURTS AND THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Twenty-five years ago, the nation’s courts could be widely credited for
the enormously positive and constructive role they had played in promoting
and developing the nation’s environmental laws. Their early rulings helped
the nation’s lawmaking efforts by embracing new, expansive theories for
pollution control law. The courts looked to seemingly ancient laws like the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,41 which led to the enactment of the Clean
Water Act,42 and the Organic Act of 1897,43 establishing the Forest
Service,44 which almost eighty years later led to the passage of the National

36.
See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 638–48.
37.
Pub. L. No. 104–19, §§ 2001–2002, 109 Stat. 194, 240–47 (1995).
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at § 2001(c)(9) (“The Secretary concerned may conduct salvage timber sales
under subsection (b) notwithstanding any decision, restraining order, or injunction issued by
a United States court before the date of the enactment of this section”); see Lazarus, supra
note 4, at 643.
41.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006); 30 Stat. 1151 (1899).
42.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (1972); see Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly
Forgotten Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2282–91 (1996).
43.
16 U.S.C. §§ 473–482 (2006).
44.
30 Stat. 11, 35 (1897).
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Forest Management Act.45 Indeed, courts not only prompted and then
welcomed these new laws.46 Some judges saw it as their judicial function to
safeguard them.47
No judge better illustrates that judicial perspective than Judge Skelly
Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.48 Judge Wright came to the D.C. Circuit from the United States
District Court sitting in New Orleans.49 Ironically, he was not elevated in
an effort to promote him because of his good work.50 The original impetus
would better be described as an effort to get rid of him because of his
rulings.51 Or at least to get him out of New Orleans, Louisiana, and the
South.52
Wright’s offense? Implementing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown
v. Board of Education by ordering the desegregation of public schools in New
Orleans.53 The southern Democratic senators reportedly told then-President
John F. Kennedy that they wanted Judge Wright gone.54 So President
Kennedy accommodated by appointing Judge Wright to the D.C. Circuit.55
Once on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Wright perceived the connection between civil rights law and environmental law: the need to protect the
unrepresented, those with less political and economic power.56 In the context
of civil rights, this had meant the protection of racial minorities who had
suffered decades of discrimination and segregation, much of which had
been formally sanctioned by law.57 Now, in environmental cases before the
federal appellate court in the nation’s capital, Judge Wright naturally
expanded his concerns to include those people with less political and
economic power who environmental protection laws sought to protect,
especially future generations.58

45.
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976); see Houck, supra note 42, at 2291–2301.
46.
E.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 201, 205–
06, 208–11 (2004).
47.
E.g., id.
48.
See id.
49.
Peter Braestrup, Wright is Named to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1961, at 18.
50.
Id.; see Jurist in Racial Dispute: James Skelly Wright, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1960, at 23;
see also Lazarus, supra note 46, at 204.
51.
Braestrup, supra note 49; Jurist in Racial Dispute, supra note 50.
52.
Braestrup, supra note 49; Jurist in Racial Dispute, supra note 50.
53.
Braestrup, supra note 49; Jurist in Racial Dispute, supra note 50; see Bill Monroe, In
Memoriam: J Skelly Wright, 102 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363–64, 371–72 (1988).
54.
See David Halberstam, Judge Is Opposed by Senator Long, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1961,
at 22.
55.
See Lazarus, supra note 46, at 204; Monroe, supra note 53, at 371–72.
56.
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 204–05.
57.
Monroe, supra note 53, at 371–72.
58.
Lazarus, supra note 46, at 204–05.
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Judge Wright’s most famous expression of the role of the courts in federal
environmental law occurred in his opinion for the court in Calvert Cliffs’
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission59 in 1971. In
applying the newly enacted National Environmental Policy Act to the
licensing proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission, Judge Wright’s
opinion literally transformed the law in a manner likely far beyond what the
senator who drafted it (Scoop Jackson from the State of Washington) and
the president who signed it (Richard Nixon) had personally anticipated.60
The very first paragraph of Calvert Cliffs made clear Judge Wright’s intent:
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a
flood of new litigation—litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes
attest to the commitment of the Government to control, at long
last, the destructive engine of material “progress.” But it
remains to be seen whether the promise of this legislation will
become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role . . . . Our duty, in
short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the
halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy.61
Consider no more than the very first sentence of the very first paragraph of that opinion. In describing laws like NEPA, Judge Wright refers
to the “promise” of a “flood of litigation.”62 A flood of litigation is not,
however, supposed to be “promised”; it is supposed to be “threatened.” But
not for Judge Wright. As the opinion continues to make plain, Judge
Wright envisioned the “judicial role” as making sure that the “important
policies” expressed in these new environmental laws were realized.63 He
expressly understood how powerful economic and political forces would
soon seek to “los[e]” or otherwise “misdirect” these policies in the “vast
hallways of the federal bureaucracy,” as he had witnessed occur with civil
rights laws in the South, in state governmental institutions rather than in
federal agencies.64 And, according to Judge Wright, “therein lies the judicial
role”: to ensure that that would not happen.65

59.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60.
A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77,
82–83 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
61.
Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1111.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
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Judicial activism? Absolutely. An unapologetic and emphatic call to
judicial arms might be a fairer characterization. For Judge Wright, and some
others, there was almost a quasi-constitutional dimension to environmental
law. While courts never endorsed the notion of a federal constitutional right
to environmental protection, they clearly treated environmental protection
concerns as entitled to special judicial protection, a heightened value in the
judicial balance.
That judicial attitude spawned other rulings. There were decisions that
expanded judicial access for environmental plaintiff citizen suits.66 There
were expansive rulings favoring stronger environmental protections, for
instance, establishing, in the absence of clear statutory support, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program under the Clean Air Act.67
Similarly courts upheld the remarkable harshness of the routine application
of joint and several liability under the federal Superfund law.68 Emblematic
of the times, the Supreme Court in 1986 ruled 9–0 in United States v.
Riverside Bayview in favor of the United States Army Corps of Engineers’
and EPA’s expansive view of the meaning of navigable waters and therefore
the geographic scope of the federal Clean Water Act.69 The Court endorsed
the agencies’ efforts to apply a functional approach to the meaning of the
statute’s language, as needed to address the problems of water pollution that
Congress had identified, even though such an approach paid little more
than lip service to the literal meaning of the terms “navigable waters” that
Congress had chosen.70
But after forty years on the federal bench and just a few months after
the first meeting of the National Association of Environmental Law Societies, Judge Wright died.71 And, in certain respects, the notion that
environmental protection rights were entitled to special judicial safeguarding passed with him. Twenty-five years ago, a new and very different
judicial attitude was spawning and reaching the nation’s highest court. The
Supreme Court building looked the same on the outside. But it was different on the inside. And the difference was reflected in the judicial
philosophy of a brand new Supreme Court Justice—Justice Antonin
Scalia—who ascended to the bench just a few months after Riverside
66.
See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Agency Regulatory Administrative
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (upholding environmental plaintiff Article III standing
notwithstanding attenuated allegations of causation).
67.
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff ’d, No. 72-1528 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), aff ’d by an equally divided Court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
68.
U.S. v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802, 809–11 (1983).
69.
474 U.S. 121, 122 (1985).
70.
Id. at 132–35.
71.
Marjorie Hunter, Judge J. Skelly Wright, Segregation Foe, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1988, at D10.
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Bayview was decided and just eighteen months before the first meeting of
the National Association of Environmental Law Societies.72
During Justice Scalia’s confirmation hearings, there was no attention
paid to his views on environmental law. But that was not because of the
absence of a record. Justice Scalia was in many respects the anti-Skelly
Wright and proud of it. In no manner was he a stealth nominee. In 1983,
three years before being sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice in September
1986, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Scalia published a law review article that
made clear his rejection of Judge Wright’s philosophy.73 In arguing for
heightened jurisdictional barriers to environmental plaintiffs’ lawsuits,
Justice Scalia did not just criticize Wright’s declaration of a new judicial role
for safeguarding the natural environment. He mocked Judge Wright.
Expressly citing to Calvert Cliffs, Justice Scalia decried “the judiciary’s long
love affair with environmental litigation.”74 He further acknowledged the
question whether his views would mean, quoting Judge Wright, that “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress [can be] lost
or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?”75 And he
did not beat around the bush, emphatically and unapologetically responding: “Of course it does—and a good thing too.”76 The Senate confirmed
Justice Scalia by a vote of 98–0.77 And there was not a single mention of
environmental law in the entire proceedings.78 The Committee report on
the Scalia nomination was only seventy-six words long.79
Once on the Court, Justice Scalia reversed the relationship between
constitutional law and the environment. In environmental law’s early years,
the question for many had been whether there already was or should be a
constitutional right to environmental protection. Justice Scalia more broadly brought to the Supreme Court a new skepticism of the wisdom of the
tough environmental laws of the 1970s and 1980s, and he channeled that
skepticism by advancing a variety of legal arguments that cast doubt on the
constitutionality of environmental protection laws and their enforcement by
private citizens. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission80 and Lucas v.
72.
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rehnquist and Scalia Take Their Places on Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1986, § 1, at 8.
73.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881 (1983).
74.
Id. at 884–85.
75.
Id. at 897.
76.
Id.
77.
132 CONG. REC. 23,813 (1986).
78.
See id. at 23,803–13; see also Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, To Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1986).
79.
Linda Greenhouse, Reporter’s Notebook: Senators vs. Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1986, at A24.
80.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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South Carolina Coastal Council,81 the issue was whether environmental protection laws amounted to unconstitutional takings of private property in the
absence of just compensation. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation82 and
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,83 the claim was that environmental plaintiff
citizen suits lacked Article III jurisdiction. And in Rapanos v. United States,
Justice Scalia championed a narrow view of Clean Water Act jurisdiction,
partly in response to his narrow view of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority.84 The latter ruling, in particular, was a far cry from the Court’s
unanimous ruling in the Riverside Bayview case, which embraced a potentially sweeping view of that Act’s geographic scope and which was decided
just a few months before Justice Scalia joined the Court.85

III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S CHALLENGES: TODAY’S
CONTRASTED WITH TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO
This is a tough time for environmental law and environmental protection. We recently witnessed the nation’s worst oil spill with the BP
Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill in the spring and summer of 2010.86 And
we are facing a potential environmental catastrophe: global climate change.
Yet, as of the writing of this essay, more than two years after the Gulf oil
spill and five years after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
announced that the evidence was “unequivocal” that global warming was
happening and that it was “very likely” that most of the warming was
caused by increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere,87 Congress has not enacted any significant legislation aimed at
preventing future oil spills or addressing the causes or consequences of
global climate change.
To be sure, during the 1980s, environmental lawmaking was getting
harder, but one axiom still could not be denied: there is nothing like an
environmental catastrophe to break a lawmaking logjam. The history of
modern environmental law is replete with examples. The dire warnings of
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in the 1960s helped prompt the regulation of
pesticides and emergence of the first wave of federal environmental statutes
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
474 U.S. 121, 132–35 (1985).
See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 173–78 (2011).
87.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, 37 (2007).
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in the early 1970s.88 The Cuyahoga River seemingly on fire and the Santa
Barbara oil spill, both in 1969, became rallying cries for the passage of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act in 1972.89 The threatened catastrophe
of a nuclear power plant meltdown in 1978 helped trigger reform of the
federal scheme for the regulation of nuclear power.90 In the late 1970s and
1980, widely publicized hazardous waste sites, such as Love Canal and
Valley of the Drums, helped move Congress to enact CERCLA in 1980.91
And in 1989, Exxon Valdez gave us the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990.92
This was legislation that, after being proposed, debated, and considered
during the late 1970s and 1980, laid dormant in Congress for ten years,
without the political momentum and sponsorship required for passage.93
Within months of the Alaska oil spill, however, Congress was able to pass
long overdue legislation.94
But by 2010, not even a catastrophe could prompt needed lawmaking.
There was nothing subtle about that Gulf oil spill: the blowout of the
Macondo well in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, the sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig, the tragic loss of eleven workers on the rig, the
spilling of hundreds of millions of gallons of oil into one of the nation’s,
indeed, the world’s, most vibrant ecosystems—the Gulf of Mexico—where
the Gulf coastlines were poised like a sponge to soak up oil to the potential
long term destruction of vital environmental and economic resources.95
What legislation has Congress enacted in two-plus years since the Gulf
oil spill? In 1989, it took a year for Congress to pass comprehensive oil spill
legislation.96 More than two years later, the nation is still waiting. Congress
88.
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58–60 (2004).
89.
Id. at 59; see Water Pollution Control Legislation: Part 1; Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S.
280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927, S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. 1015 and S.
1017 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, 92nd Cong.
374 (1971) (statement of Rep. Charles A. Vanik); see also 118 CONG. REC. 10,218 (1972).
90.
See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Comm.—The Rogovin Rep.: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Env’t, Energy, and Natural Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. (1980).
91.
Lazarus, supra note 88, at 108; see Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); see also
126 CONG. REC. 26337, 26340, 26347 (1980); see also Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:
Administration Testimony on S. 1480 to the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution and Resource Prot. of the
S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 96th Cong. (1979).
92.
See S. REP. NO. 101-99 (1989).
93.
See Tanker Safety in Alaska: Part 3; Hearings on S. 182, S. 568, S. 682, S. 715, and S.
898 Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 95th Cong. (1977); see also Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liab. and Comp. Act: Hearing on H.R. 85 Before the Subcomm. on Water Res.
of the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 96th Cong. (1979); see also Leo H. Carney, For
Environmentalists, The Battle Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1981, § 11, at NJ22.
94.
136 CONG. REC. 21, 726, 22,299 (1990); Philip Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill
Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, § 1, at 1.
95.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, supra note 86, at 173–78.
96.
Schneider, supra note 30, § 4, at 4.
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has done nothing to provide government with the resources needed for
more careful planning of deepwater drilling to provide for more effective
government oversight and risk management of these important drilling
operations, or to provide the Department of the Interior, Coast Guard,
EPA, or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration with the
resources they need to respond to such spills when they occur.
This is all low-hanging fruit, in everyone’s interest—the oil companies,
the Gulf States, business interests in those states, and individual citizens.
Winners without losers. But instead of needed legislation, we see continued
legislative stalemate.97 And included in the laws proposed for enactment
are, ironically, laws that would eliminate existing safeguards and increase
rather than reduce risks of major spills by expediting the drilling process in
the absence of needed oversight.98 The only legislation that Congress has
enacted is designed largely to spread the spoils of the spill—in the form of
the billions of dollars in potential civil penalties BP might have to pay for
causing the spill—between the States and federal agencies clamoring for
their respective fare shares.99 No doubt some good can come from such
monies, but none is likely to address the fundamental causes of the spill,
which is why, on the second anniversary of the oil spill, the President’s Oil
Spill Commission (reconstituted as “Oil Spill Commission Act”), assigned
Congress the grade of “D” based on its total abdication of legislative
responsibility to respond with effective legislation to prevent future oil
spills.100
And if Congress cannot address something as relatively simple as
deepwater drilling in the immediate aftermath of the clear lessons taught by
the 2010 Gulf oil spill, how much hope can one garner that Congress will be
capable of addressing what is likely the most important environmental issue
of the 21st century: global climate change. As I (and others) have previously
described, global climate change is a lawmaking nightmare—a “super wicked”
problem.101 The root of the problem is how cause and effect in climate
97.
98.

Editorial, The Big Spill, Two Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, at A26.
See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41684, Summary of OIL
SPILL LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2011).
99.
Congress passed the Conference Report on H.R. 4348, June 29, 2012, and President Obama signed the bill into law on July 6, 2012. See Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 1601–1608.
The new law creates a Gulf Coast Restoration Fund, financed by eighty percent of the civil
penalties, fines and other settlements from the 2010 Gulf oil spill. Id.
100.
OIL SPILL COMMISSION ACTION, ASSESSING PROGRESS: IMPLEMENTING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION 2 (2012) (assigning
Congress a grade of “D” in efforts “to make offshore drilling safer and to improve the
nation’s ability to respond to oil spills that may occur. Unfortunately, so far, Congress has
provided neither leadership nor support for these efforts.”).
101.
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change—Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009).
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change are spread over time and space and the absence of any corresponding, dependable lawmaking authorities over either dimension.102 Global
climate change eludes the short-term time horizons of elected officials. It
eludes the short spatial horizons of governments. And it feeds into the
short-term thinking of many Americans.103
Nonetheless, as recently as 2009, national, comprehensive global climate
change legislation seemed a virtual political certainty.104 The nation seemed
poised for a truly historic lawmaking moment.105 All the necessary pieces
seemed to be simultaneously in place. A newly-elected president who had
campaigned on the issue and, within a week of his inauguration, spoke
about the compelling need for such legislation.106 The President had accordingly placed in key leadership positions throughout the executive branch a
series of appointees uniformly dedicated to the legislation’s passage as an
administration top priority: EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson,107 Secretary
of Energy Steven Chu,108 NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco,109 White
House Science Advisor John Holdren,110 Council on Environmental Quality
Chair Nancy Sutley,111 and, of course, White House Director of the Office
of Energy and Climate Change Carol Browner.112 No less important, Capitol Hill was also ready. The leadership in all the critical spots was on board.
In the Senate, that included the Senate Majority leader, Harry Reid,113
Chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Barbara
Boxer,114 and Chair of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Jeff Bingaman.115 In the House, it included Speaker Nancy Pelosi116
and House Committee on Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Henry
102.
Id. at 1166–87.
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 1155–56.
105.
Id.
106.
Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address.
107.
John M. Broder, Cabinet Choices Answer Questions from Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2009, at A22.
108.
David M. Herszenhorn and Helene Cooper, 2 Confirmed for Economy and for
National Security, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at P14.
109.
Cornelia Dean, NOAA Chief Believes in Science as Social Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2009, at D2.
110.
Edward Wong & Andrew C. Revkin, Experts in U.S. and China See a Chance for
Cooperation Against Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A14.
111.
Broder, supra note 107, at A22.
112.
John M. Broder, E.P.A. Pick Vows to Put Science First, NYTIMES.COM (Jan. 14,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/us/politics/15webjackson.html?_r=1.
113.
‘Obama’s People’: A Who’s Who, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at MM53.
114.
S. 18, 111th Cong. (2009).
115.
Id.
116.
H.R. 2, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Waxman.117 Congressman Waxman’s position, in particular, underscored the
seriousness of the momentum pushing for climate legislation.118 Based on a
strict seniority basis, John Dingell from Michigan should have served as
Chair, and Dingell has long been one of the House’s most powerful members and certainly not a person to challenge lightly.119 Waxman nevertheless
challenged Dingell for the Chair position and won precisely because of the
concern of many Democrats that Dingell, because of his longstanding ties
to the auto industry, would not be sufficiently supportive of climate change
legislation.120
Nor was support for climate change legislation limited to Democrats in
the White House or in Congress, or environmentalists.121 There was bipartisan support.122 Leaders of the Republican Party had endorsed the need for
national legislation, including the party’s nominee for president in the 2008
election123 and two who became prominent candidates for their party’s
nomination for 2012: Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich.124 Industry leaders
had likewise come out in favor of comprehensive climate change legislation.125
But what can either the White House or Congress show in terms of
legislative accomplishments? Nothing. Or worse than nothing. National
climate change legislation has become politically toxic. No one will touch
global climate change. Industry leaders have walked away from their earlier
endorsement. Republican leaders who once touted their support now
repudiate their prior positions.126
Even President Obama, who campaigned on the issue in 2008, and
made clear the issue’s compelling urgency in 2009 and 2010, shied away
from the issue during the next two years of his presidency. Contrast presidential rhetoric at the outset of his presidency to 2011. Here is what the
President said one week after taking office in 2009: “These urgent dangers
to our national and economic security are compounded by the long-term
threat of climate change, which if left unchecked could result in violent
117.
H.R. 8, 111th Cong. (2009).
118.
Lyndsey Layton, Californians Shape Up as Force on Environmental Policy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at A3.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Andrew Revkin, Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, § Week in Review, at 6
(describing Senator McCain’s sponsorship of climate change legislation in 2003).
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Ezra Klein, Obama, Romney and Gingrich Share A Lot—Except in Courage, WASH.
POST, Nov. 29, 2011, at A8; Dan Eggen, ‘08 Shift on Energy Was Boon to Gingrich Group,
WASH. POST, Dec. 29 2011, at A4.
125.
Steve Mufson, Push to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Would Put a Price on Emitting
Pollution, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at D1 (describing support of industry leaders in U.S.
Climate Action Partnership for significant national climate change legislation).
126.
E.g., Klein, supra note 124, at A8; Eggen, supra note 124, at A4.
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conflict, terrible storms, shrinking coastlines, and irreversible catastrophe.
These are the facts, and they are well known to the American people.”127
But later, even a president who sincerely believes in the urgency of the
danger and the irreversibility of the threatened catastrophe, literally
stopped even saying the words climate change or global warming. President
Obama said the words “global climate change” or “global warming” in sixtythree speeches and remarks in 2009. He said those words seventy-three
times in 2010. How many times did he dare to utter those words in 2011?
Once.128 The President’s sole reference to climate change came on January
19, 2011, in a joint news conference with the President of China.129 And,
that was in response to the President of China’s reference to climate change
as a possible area for U.S.-China cooperation.130 After January 19th, President Obama did not mention climate change once more in all of 2011.
Global climate change as Lord Voldemort: a threat that even the President
dared not name, at least until after re-election.
There is, however, even broader significance to the fact that it was a
comment of China’s President that prompted the President of the United
States to utter the words that otherwise were remarkably soon to be struck
from his public vocabulary: the emergence of international and global environmental law during the past twenty-five years. The developments abroad
during that time period may in broad strokes be fairly analogized to domestic legal developments here within our own borders during the 1970s and
1980s.131 There has been an explosion of environmental laws worldwide.
And just as the United States seems to be retreating from a leadership role
in addressing climate change, either with new laws or new technology,
China may well be on the cusp of promoting significant new technology
and new laws addressing global climate change, including cap and trade.132
To be an environmental lawyer today, one must look far beyond just our
own borders. One is not going to solve global climate change with an exclusive focus on U.S. law, especially with the existing lawmaking logjam here.
And one is not going to protect the Gulf of Mexico from the risks of deep127.
Remarks of the President of the United States on Energy, Public Papers of the
President (Jan. 26, 2009).
128.
These statistics for 2009, 2010, and 2011 are based on a WESTLAW Search of the
“Presidential Documents” file during those three years, searching for the words “global
warming” or “climate change.” This file includes all the remarks and speeches delivered by
the President.
129.
Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People’s Republic of China, Public Papers of the President (Jan. 19, 2011).
130.
Id.
131.
See, e.g., Yang & Percival, supra note 3, at 617–19, 628–30, 637.
132.
See Information Office of the State Council, China’s Policies and Actions for
Addressing Climate Change, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Nov. 2011, http://www.gov.cn/
english/official/2011-11/22/content_2000272.htm (last visited June 26, 2012).
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water drilling or the Arctic from the risks of expanded drilling in that
harsh, inaccessible environment, by just focusing on the risks generated by
activities within our territorial jurisdiction. Climate change, by its nature,
clearly can be effectively addressed only with an unprecedented degree of
international coordination and cooperation. And effective oversight of
offshore oil drilling activities by Cuba and Mexico in the Gulf and Russia in
the Arctic are no less needed than such oversight by U.S. governmental
authorities.

CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years ago, each of the speakers who joined me on the panel
at the University of Michigan Law School’s National Association of Environmental Law Societies Conference in March 2012 was quite differently
situated. I was an Assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General, working on environmental cases before the Supreme Court that Justice Scalia had just
joined. Lois Schiffer, now General Counsel of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, was back then General Counsel of National
Public Radio, and about to become, only a few years later, the longest
serving Assistant Attorney General in the history of the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division. Professor Bob
Percival, after clerking for Justice Byron White and then working for six
years for the Environmental Defense Fund, had recently begun his academic career at the University of Maryland, where he has since built one of the
nation’s premier programs in environmental law. And Professor Holly
Doremus, after obtaining a Ph.D. in Botany from Cornell University, was a
first-year law student on her way to becoming one of the nation’s leading
environmental law scholars.
For each of us, our immersion in environmental law during the past
twenty-five years has been enormously rewarding, exciting, and challenging.
What an extraordinary privilege to practice, engage, and teach about one of
this nation’s truly great and constructive legal revolutions. The challenges
that the next generation of environmental lawyers will face are no less
significant or potentially rewarding. Much has been accomplished. But
there is far more yet to be done. The stakes are unsettlingly high. Not just
in the United States, but in the world.

